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 Abstract 
The field of ‘moral economy’ explores the ways in which seemingly amoral 
economic institutions are normatively and politically instituted. However 
it has tended to neglect the question of how economic actors make 
commitments to the long-term future, of the sort that are implied by the 
idea of ‘sustainable prosperity’. Work by Jens Beckert and Elena Esposito 
has brought a dynamic perspective to economic sociology, and helps 
pinpoint the precise problem posed by neoliberalism, namely that it seeks 
to channel all forms of futurity, hope and promise into market-based 
mechanisms, such as credit, risk, derivatives, business models and so on. 
This way of instituting ‘the future’ presents a blockage to all alternative 
forms of planning, design or imagination, where the latter seek non-
economistic, potentially incalculable forms of long-term commitment (for 
instance to future generations). Challenging the neoliberal framing of ‘the 
future’ requires a rediscovery of the forms of futurity, utopianism and hope 
that were present in modernism, but now need reinstating in ways that are 




Since the birth of sociology in the late 19th century, economic sociologists 
have highlighted the various ways in which seemingly amoral, technical 
and mathematical dimensions of capitalism are tacitly derived from moral 
commitments and norms. Hence, key commercial institutions such as 
contract and property are derivative of religious metaphysics (Durkheim, 
1991); the work ethic that drives economic accumulation is a legacy of 
Protestant ethics (Weber, 2002); market exchange can be viewed as a form 
of normative reciprocity, but one which is accounted for (Mauss, 2002). 
Money itself originates as a promise, which depends on moral bonds of 
trust to retain value (Nietzsche, 2013; Graeber, 2012).   
More recently, the field of ‘moral economy’ has demonstrated the ways in 
which economic institutions are fundamentally constituted as normative 
conventions. According to this perspective, the attempt to split society 






2 |  CUSP WORKING PAPER No. 5 
  
 
misguided, and we should instead look to the way in which our economic 
notions of value are already imbued with metaphysical and ethical content 
(Stark, 2009). Statistics, for example, depend on the moral assumption that 
all human beings should be counted, for public policy to be justified 
(Desrosieres, 1998). Moral-economic rhetoric becomes especially 
important in the workplace, where management confronts a constant 
problem of how to win the commitment of employees (Boltanski & 
Chiapello, 2007). On closer inspection, the rhetoric of economics – such as 
‘worth’, ‘investment’, ‘earn’ – reveals its moral underbelly, meaning that 
there is no realm of political economy that is free from normative or 
ethical presuppositions (Beckert & Aspers, 2011; Sayer, 2015). The 
sociological question is then which normative and ethical frameworks are 
at work and where, and which ones are being marginalised or suppressed 
(Boltanski & Thevenot, 2006).  
Capitalism, therefore, depends on moral frameworks, beliefs and rhetorics 
for its propagation and success. But, from the perspective of moral 
economy, it also faces constant challenges to its legitimacy from within. 
Often these challenges focus on the failure of capitalism to deliver on its 
moral promises (for instance, that the market is not the ‘level playing field’ 
that its advocates claim). Sometimes, two rival moral visions of the 
economy – for example one privileging consumers, the other investors - 
confront each other. Alternatively, critique may denounce the ways in 
which capitalism, markets and calculation destroy their own social 
foundations, ‘the tragedy of the commons’ or ‘negative externalities’ that 
engulf civil society, the public sphere and nature (Polanyi, 1957; Hardin, 
1968). Finally, there are situations where human suffering is simply 
deemed intolerable and demands a response, purely by virtue of its 
extremity (Boltanski, 1999). What Boltanski terms the ‘sociology of 
critique’ involves mapping these various moral arguments, denunciations 
and conflicts.  
These investigations of moral-economic frameworks tend to reproduce one 
common tendency of moral philosophy more generally: they focus on the 
present and the living. They explore (for example) the ways in which one 
set of actors denounces the actions of another; the implicit concepts of 
justice (and injustice) at work in statistical frameworks; the way sympathy 
works; the rhetorical appeals that management makes to labour; and so on. 
In this respect, they are implicitly contractual and static in their concept of 
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contemporary moral spheres. But a number of contemporary cultural, 
technological and economic trends suggest that this emphasis on the 
contemporary as the space of moral evaluation is now inadequate. Two in 
particular need highlighting, both of which raise the problem of 
‘intergenerational justice’ and the moral commitments and sentiments 
humans have towards the ‘afterlife’ that succeeds their own finite 
existence (Scheffler, 2013).  
Firstly, as inequality rises, income is increasingly linked to the ownership 
of assets, rather than to labour, meaning that society becomes increasingly 
unequal (Piketty, 2014). This signals an ethical crisis, for it breaks a key 
moral promise of capitalism that reward will be roughly proportionate to 
‘effort’ or ‘talent’, and produces a new rentier class (Sayer, 2015). However, 
it is a moral crisis that is distinctively diachronic in nature: the problem 
cannot be understood purely in terms of the distribution between rich and 
poor as it exists now, but how that distribution becomes progressively 
skewed, thanks to the tendency (identified by Piketty) of capital to become 
increasingly concentrated over time. Family inheritance has become an 
increasingly significant means of reproducing advantage and disadvantage. 
Moral instincts to conserve goods for future generations are diverted from 
public assets and traditions and towards private ones (Honig, 2013). 
Financial leverage makes acquisition of assets far easier for those that are 
already asset rich. Meanwhile, for those without the fortune to be born into 
wealth, access to social goods such as housing, higher education and day-
to-day social security becomes tied to rising indebtedness, locking them 
into commitments over the long-term (Lazzarato, 2012). For the less 
fortunate, decisions to spend money in the present can have ramifications 
that last decades into the future; the more fortunate are protected from 
this by accumulation of wealth and asset price inflation that began decades 
in the past. Either way, the individual and intergenerational lifecycle is 
implicated in questions of economic justice.  
Secondly, anthropogenic climate change forces us to think about time in 
an entirely new way, and with vastly extended time horizons (Malm, 2016). 
The very possibility of capitalism, as a system driven by constant 
expansion of productive capacity, becomes reframed in terms of the 
material affordances of compacted hydrocarbons deposited hundreds of 
millions of years in the past, then transfigured into a primary (and 
unaccounted for) factor of economic growth via the industrial revolution 
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implications of climate change (together with deposits of nuclear waste 
and the pollution of the oceans by plastics) stretch into the very distant 
future, well beyond what any orthodox economic or moral frameworks are 
capable of capturing. This has seen the emergence of moral and political 
philosophies which accommodate the interests of unborn generations and 
dispense with the linear view of the future as a continuation of the present 
(Forrester, 2016). It also underscores the Burkean, conservative critique of 
contract theory, namely that it fails to account for previous and future 
generations in its vision of justice (Scruton, 2014).   
Just as moral philosophy must engage with diachronic and intergenera-
tional issues (including moral commitments to the very distant future), so 
moral economy must be reconfigured to take time more seriously, to 
consider the ways in which time is normatively instituted by existing 
capitalist mechanisms (such as financial instruments) but also how 
temporality and futurity are the basis of crucial moral critiques of 
capitalism today. To be sure, there are many ways in which the future is 
represented, valued and calculated in contemporary capitalism, but 
arguably (as we shall see) these serve as an obstacle preventing alternative 
visions, utopias and economic valuation systems, which might conceive of 
time in a wholly different way.   
This paper seeks to connect existing literature in ‘moral economy’ to the 
problem of temporality and futurity, specifically to consider how 
capitalism confronts (or avoids) demands for a radically different economic 
future and concern for the radically distant economic future. If we are to 
escape the presentist bias of both moral philosophy and moral economy, 
we need to start mapping the ways in which the future is represented in 
contemporary economic institutions (for better or worse) and also how it 
fuels the critique of contemporary economic institutions. That in turn 
might help us better to appreciate the value of alternative economic 
systems in the present. The claim that contemporary capitalism is not 
‘sustainable’ can be heard in a range of ways, some conservative, others 
radical and others apocalyptic. These different rhetorics of critique 
sometimes bleed into each other.  
The rest of the paper is in four parts. Firstly, I explore mechanisms through 
which the future is represented and acted upon as studied by recent 
economic sociologists, drawing heavily on Jens Beckert’s work on ‘fictional 
expectations’ (2016). Secondly, I look at the way in which neoliberal 
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central position in modernity, employing market mechanisms to confront 
uncertainty, not only in an economic sense but in a more fundamental 
existential and historical sense. Thirdly, I look at how the very idea of ‘the 
future’ as a collective destination is imperilled by this reliance on market-
based instruments, but also what such a ‘future’ might still mean. Finally, I 
look at how the moral-economic problem of intergenerational time can 
and can’t be grasped by these modes of moral-economic critique today. 
 
The future as economic artefact   
One of the characteristics of ‘modernity’ as a sociological category is the 
distinctive experience of time that it implies, for individuals and for 
societies. From the 18th century onwards, history became conceived as 
something which unfolded progressively, meaning that the present was 
unlike the past, and the future would be unlike the present again 
(Luhmann, 1976). The present exists between these two non-existent 
times, the empirical one known as ‘history’ and the imaginary one known 
as the ‘future’. If the Enlightenment was the crucible of this modern 
philosophical consciousness of time, it acquired explicit cultural 
formations in the late 19th century with aesthetic modernism, science 
fiction and political projects dedicated to designing alternative political 
and economic futures (Jameson, 2005). Because the future is the object of 
imagination, and not of cognition, future-oriented individuals share a 
common empirical ignorance that none can overcome (Esposito, 2011; 
Hayek, 1945). The impossibility of time travel represents a constraint with 
egalitarian properties.  
While capitalism is manifestly a modernising and modernist force (Berman, 
2010), there has been comparatively little sociological attention to the 
ways in which its particular institutions, norms, and practices embed this 
orientation towards the future. One important attempt to redress this is 
Jens Beckert’s Imagined Futures (2016). As Beckert argues: 
“Capitalism can only expand if actors embrace the unpredictability of the 
future. If imaginaries of a distant, better future fade away or are 
obscured by fear, time horizons shrink and actors forego opportunities 
for further, future growth. As a result the capitalist dynamic slows.” 
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A central fact about capitalism is that individuals and firms have the 
opportunity to produce new things in new ways, and to consume new 
things. As entrepreneurs, employees and consumers, individuals face the 
future on the understanding that it will not necessarily be a simple 
repetition of the past. Meanwhile, the nature of the novelty is such that it 
cannot be entirely calculated on the basis of past data: it involves 
uncertainty, and not only risk (Knight, 1957). The periodic eruption of 
capitalist crises confirms that the future is not entirely within anyone’s 
control, and these crises occasion a transformation of the economic 
landscape that is then irreversible.  
The institutions of capitalism both facilitate and accommodate this future-
oriented existence. Beckert coins the term ‘fictional expectations’ to 
describe the various ways in which actors represent the future in such a 
way that it appears as if it were an empirical reality that can be acted on, 
but is ultimately just a product of the imagination. 
“Under conditions of uncertainty, assessments of how the future will look 
share important characteristics with literary fiction; most importantly, 
they create a reality of their own by making assertions that go beyond the 
reporting of empirical facts. Fiction pretends a reality where the author 
and the readers act as if the described reality were true.”  
(Beckert, 2016: 61) 
One of the crucial institutions in this respect is money, which possesses no 
intrinsic value or use, but which mediates our relationship to the future. 
When money functions effectively, we invest confidence that it will retain 
its value in future and that others will continue to accept it in future. 
Saving money is a way of preparing for a future that cannot be known in 
advance. Lending money to entrepreneurs is an investment in their 
‘fictional expectation’ of future revenues. Money both opens us up to an 
unknowable and uncertain future (offering infinite possible uses), and also 
renders that existential uncertainty manageable, insuring us against the 
threat of infinite possible contingencies (Esposito, 2011). In that respect, 
credit money (which exists in the form of paper) is a distinctively modern 
and groundless phenomenon, which promises to connect past, present and 
future, under conditions of historical and existential transformation 
(Simmel, 2004). It takes on a transcendent moral quality, thanks to the 
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These relationships to the future are moral inasmuch as they involve 
promises which are in principle binding. Efforts at reputation-building, 
such as branding and corporate social responsibility (CSR), aim to 
inculcate trust that past behaviour is a reliable indication of future 
behaviour. By transcending the here and now, a brand generates fictional 
expectations that future behaviour and outcomes will be proper and ethical. 
CSR extends this logic in various directions, employing the normative-
temporal logic of brands in order to build a reputation for behaving 
ethically in relation to various stakeholders. Besides this, advocates of CSR 
construct a fictional expectation that adherents to ethical business 
principles will in future reap economic rewards, as a side-effect of virtuous 
behaviour (Abend, 2014). 
Economic promises regarding the future are often parasitical on political 
and social promises provided by the state (Fligstein, 2001). For instance, 
money has the symbolic backing of state sovereignty, even if most of the 
money in circulation is produced by private banks. Banks benefit from 
deposit insurance provided by the state, entrepreneurs are protected by 
bankruptcy legislation and shareholders by limited liability. Such 
institutions alleviate the full gravity of uncertainty that would exist in a 
wholly privatised economy, and allow the future to be faced with some 
degree of confidence. Less certain are the promises politicians make 
regarding rising prosperity (typically represented in GDP growth) and 
employment, though these were the bedrock of the post-war macro-
economy. The expectation that ‘the economy’ will be bigger next year than 
this year is ultimately a fiction, which rests (amongst other things) on the 
convention that there is a thing called ‘the economy’ at all (Mitchell, 2005). 
By restricting the power of finance in particular, Keynesianism ensured 
that economic promises and political promises were entangled with each 
other. Reducing the power of private finance to issue promises (with the 
‘animal spirits’ that Keynes saw going with that) created space for the state 
to issue them in the form of collective plans.  
Fictional expectations are necessary because capitalist economies are not 
merely repetitive, but progressive and evolutionary. In order for a new 
business to attract capital, it needs to tell – and perform - a credible story 
about its future and how it will earn income (Doganova & Muniesa, 2015). 
In order for a new product to attract customers, it needs to be accompanied 
by a credible narrative and image of how it will benefit consumers, i.e. 
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place it in a bank, they have to believe the stories that regulators and 
central bankers tell about their plans to minimise inflation and financial 
risk. All of these can be bolstered by calculative devices and numbers 
which reassure actors that there is some rationality involved; but they 
don’t alleviate the ontological unknowability of the future, and are 
therefore ultimately dependent on the power of human imagination and 
binding power of moral commitments.  
Beckert is clear that there is a politics of fictional expectations: “power in 
the economy is exercised to the extent an actor can make his own 
imaginary of the future become influential and mobilize others to turn it 
into the future present” (2016: 85). Certain individuals and institutions 
find it far easier to attract credit and investment or to market new goods, 
for example, than others. Those who are already rich may find it easier to 
render their fictional expectations credible, meaning that money can be 
employed to influence the imaginary of the economy more broadly. One of 
the dangers of over-dominant imaginaries is that economic actors start to 
take the future for granted, allowing the ‘pretence’ that is at work in 
fictional expectations and forgetting that it isn’t real. This can occasion 
crises, as over-confidence turns to a crisis of confidence, and then a search 
takes place for alternative narratives and visions.    
 
Neoliberal futures  
A central proposition of neoliberalism is that centralised political visions 
of the future are inherently faulty and potentially dangerous. According to 
neoliberal critics such as Hayek, efforts by politicians to plan the future 
involve imposing a set of values upon the collective, and quashing the 
various opinions, perspectives, estimates and values of private individuals 
and firms with their own private economic agendas (Hayek, 1944, 1945). To 
put this in Beckert’s terms, the danger of government economic planning, 
from a neoliberal perspective, is that it imposes a fictional expectation 
regardless of whether individuals which to invest it with credibility. One of 
the downsides of this (as explored by the rational expectations school of 
economics) is that, when governments declare their plans for the future, 
individual investors and firms can adjust their own plans accordingly, 
producing unintended consequences such as inflation. Regardless of how 
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depends on it being believed, which neoliberals argue it eventually will not 
be. Even if politicians are sincere in the promises they make, the side 
effects of public planning mean that they will be unable to deliver on them.  
The neoliberal alternative is to suggest that the future is beyond any form 
of collective control, and that this truth must therefore become embedded 
in quasi-constitutional terms. The function of the state is not to represent 
or design the future, in the way that socialists, Keynesians and planners 
had, but to create the most reliable framework within which private visions 
of the future can be developed, propagated and sold to investors and 
consumers. As Mirowski has argued, neoliberalism starts from an 
epistemological premise that there is no reliable knowledge on which 
authoritative public policy could be founded, and therefore the state must 
trust markets (and quasi-markets) to organise a vast plurality of 
perspectives and narratives (Mirowski, 2013). The task of the state is to 
create stable regulatory and monetary conditions within which private 
economic actors can potentially make credible promises to each other: 
these include low and steady inflation, strong property rights, predictable 
regulation, minimal political uncertainty. What this means is that, in order 
for entrepreneurs and financiers to be constantly innovating and risk-
taking, the political framework of society must remain as steady and 
constant as possible (Davies, 2014).  
Just as the opportunities for political actors to represent the future then 
goes into decline, the opportunities for economic actors to do so expands 
greatly. Because neoliberalism starts from the premise that the future is 
unknowable, there is no type of future eventuality that can’t potentially be 
incorporated into this paradigm via instruments of risk management, 
forecasting and insurance. The development of derivatives from the 1970s 
onwards took the uncertainty of future events, and turned this into a profit 
stream, treating the future’s “inactuality as a resource” (Esposito, 2011: 
20). In response to failures of Keynesian and socialist state-led 
modernisation, neoliberalism seizes the latent modernity of money, capital 
and risk and grants it a foundational position in how societies and 
individuals confront the future. All modernity becomes economic 
modernity (Davies, 2016).  Rather than politicians or experts needing to 
anticipate or control what is around the corner, they focus on creating the 
framework within which professional futurists – entrepreneurs, venture 







10 |  CUSP WORKING PAPER No. 5 
  
 
Under neoliberalism, techniques of risk modelling and future-mapping 
that developed within the market sphere come to permeate all areas of life. 
‘Prediction markets’ are constructed to aggregate perspectives on the 
future. Discount rates, contingent valuation and cost benefit analysis allow 
for any future outcome to be calculated, in terms of its probability and 
distance into the future. Credit can expand into more and more areas of 
social life, as the capacity to calculate credit-worthiness and predict future 
revenues expands into new territories (Leyshon & Thrift, 2007). It is 
thanks to such innovations that private finance can engulf low-income and 
precarious communities (‘sub-prime’) which were historically denied credit 
(Poon, 2007). Business models of new ventures start to become more far-
fetched in their envisioning of future behaviours and norms, and not only 
of future products (Doganova & Muniesa, 2015).  
There is no disruption or change that cannot potentially be represented 
using techniques of risk calculation. Equally, there is no social cost that 
can’t potentially be solved by rendering it calculable in financial terms. 
Problems, such as environmental degradation, which appear to be effects of 
corporate strategy and capitalist growth come to be represented as 
opportunities for new corporate strategies and growth (Wright & Nyberg, 
2015). The Law and Economics tradition represents crime and public harm 
only in terms of calculable inefficiencies, then assumes that these are best 
redressed through financial compensation rather than criminalisation or 
moral sanctions (Davies, 2010). This often involves calculating a price for 
‘public goods’, through techniques such as ‘willingness to pay’ surveys 
(Fourcade, 2011). Negative externalities such as carbon dioxide emissions 
can be supposedly dealt with through the construction of new markets, 
within which these costs can be distributed to the producers which can 
carry them most efficiently (Lane, 2012; Stephan & Lane, 2014). Corporate 
logic of reputation-building combined with entrepreneurial imagination, 
underpinned by ever smarter forms of risk-modelling, becomes elevated to 
the ultimate safeguard against the uncertain future.  
The moral economy of neoliberalism is one that seeks to represent all 
commitments – including those to the future and to future generations – 
in calculable monetary terms. It is therefore a regime of value that seeks to 
crowd out all other regimes of valuation, including those on which the 
success of market economies might depend. Wherever there is evidence of 
collective action problems (in the social or environmental spheres), the 
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be appropriately priced and thereby accommodated within private 
investment plans. This prioritisation of financial logic is a moral project, 
inasmuch as it requires individuals and firms to respect obligations of debt, 
contract and compensation (Rose, 1996; Lazzarato, 2012). Moral economy 
can bring this underlying normativity to light, for instance by showing how 
rates of discount are selected or the methodologies through which ‘nature’ 
is valued. But this is also a monistic project, in that it closes down space 
within which rival moral logics might arise, including other moral 
relationships to the future and the public good.  
 
‘The future’ lost and found 
A number of critics have argued that the dawn of the neoliberal epoch 
coincided with the disappearance of ‘the future’, in the sense that it 
emerged in the 19th century as a space of political fantasy and promise 
(Jameson, 2005; Murphy, 2015). Franco Berardi has argued that ‘the future’, 
as conceived by modernists, utopian science fiction writers and the 
Futurists themselves, peaked in 1968, and was dead by 1977 (2011). This is 
seen in the appearance of what became known as ‘postmodernism’ as an 
aesthetic and architectural style from 1973 onwards, combined with more 
dystopian forms of science fiction. Postmodernism is widely understood as 
signalling a loss of historical sensibility, and a turn towards a new spatial 
politics, where everything is contemporaneous to everything else and “all 
politics is about real estate” (Jameson, 1992, 2016). Rather than hope for a 
different future, radical politics becomes about discovering different 
spaces or different bodies as they co-exist in the present.  
One way of articulating this would be to say that, under neoliberalism, 
modernist exuberance for the future shifts from the realm of political 
society and culture into the institutions of finance. In Beckert’s terms, it is 
the fictional expectations of professional risk assessors, credit-raters and 
model builders that come to count. Because collective futures are no longer 
anticipated or promised by public agencies, and because the function of 
the state shifts to the maintenance of reliable money and regulations, 
society is no longer a space or object of utopian representation.  The 
disappearance of inflation – one of the central objectives of neoliberalism 
from the mid-1970s onwards – represents the great triumph of financial 
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threaten to inject political uncertainty into the future of a sort that might 
damage financial interests. But the appearance of deflation and negative 
interest rates in the post-2008 era demonstrates how such triumphs turn 
sour: the promise of money becomes more credible than anything else, 
meaning there is nothing worth spending on or investing in.  
The neoliberal replacement of collective futurism by calculable financial 
risk encounters a substantial philosophical problem. This is a problem of 
reflexivity or performativity that economistic techniques of risk analysis 
cannot compute: the present that occurs now is shaped by how an 
imaginary future was acted upon in the past. Risk assessment doesn’t just 
represent the future; in altering behaviour in the present, it also changes 
the future that ultimately elapses. Esposito puts this as follows: 
“The weakness of economic theory results from its lack of circularity. 
This lack prevents it from considering both the way in which the present 
depends on a future that depends on what the present expects from it, 
and also the fact that operators observe each other and the theory that 
describes their behavior. Economic theory has failed to observe itself and 
its relationship with its object of study.” 
(Esposito, 2011: 11-12) 
To use the example of environmental degradation, costs we are living with 
now are not simply an unavoidable externality of 200 years of industrial 
growth; they are also a consequence of environmental policy failures in the 
very recent past. Time-limited targets for reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions, which were viewed as critical when set only a few years ago, 
have now been missed and become part of the past. ‘By then it will be too 
late’ is a phrase that has been used in the past to describe the present we 
are now in – so how do we act? The global financial crisis (which emanated 
from derivatives) showed that the progressive spread of risk management 
into more and more areas of society generates uncertainties of its own, 
that cannot be resolved simply through more risk management. This was a 
failure which occurred over time, as calculative devices gradually lost their 
purchase on the uncertainties they are constructed to compute. 
Techniques of risk management can therefore become too successful in 
representing the future, and end up altering the future to the point where 
they no longer represent it adequately. This type of self-cancelling 
prophecy is what MacKenzie terms ‘counter-performativity’ (MacKenzie, 
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them as empirical rather than as imagined ‘as if’ scenarios, and start to act 
as if the future was knowable after all. The assumptions on which such 
techniques are based do not adapt to the performative power that they 
acquire over time. This means that they project linear futures, while 
transforming society in non-linear ways.  
A second consequence of this is that, in certain important ways, the 
openness and uncertainty of the future is closed down by inequality. 
Certain individuals acquire far more power over the future than others, 
which when converted into wealth then produces even greater power to 
shape the future. Piketty has demonstrated that the rate of return on 
capital is typically higher than the rate of growth in income (Piketty, 2014). 
Ownership of assets yields income that enables the purchase of more 
assets, generating a rentier class who are protected from the uncertainty of 
the future by capital and the income it generates. Rather than a tool for 
engaging with uncertainty, capital serves as a means of minimizing it, 
reproducing advantages in the process. Conversely, those without assets 
rely increasingly on credit in order to cope with uncertainties (such as the 
loss of income or family upheaval), which then locks them into obligations 
to their creditors. This may also produce snowballing effects, where more 
debt is taken on to settle previous debts. These effects suggest that 
capitalist inequality has inbuilt tendencies to rise over time, and economic 
modernity – the sense of a future that is different from the past – may 
become less plausible.  
The reproduction of inequality via family inheritance represents a 
particular challenge to the neoliberal vision of modernity. The crucial 
capitalist coupling through which the uncertain future is seized and 
shaped is that between entrepreneur and creditor: the heroic figure with a 
credible narrative and the financier seeking a narrative to capitalize. 
Rentier elites looking to preserve their wealth for their own offspring lack 
the modernist orientation, while those inheriting that wealth have no 
incentive to take risks. The uncertainty of the future is not embraced, as in 
the romantic vision of entrepreneurship and capitalization, but closed 
down via private property rights and inheritance.   
While the neoliberal epistemology may simply demand more risk models 
or risk-taking, to alleviate the failures of the present, another conclusion 
to draw is that the future needs instead to be imagined and represented in 
non-financial, uncalculated ways. In a certain sense, ‘the future’ (of the 
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1970s) needs to be revived, in order to escape the economistic cycle, in 
which the future is declared beyond collective control, as the premise of 
endless financialisation. A more wholesale social transformation is 
necessary, but confidence in this has been eroded.   
Literary fiction is one source of alternative future visions, and shares many 
of the properties of the fictional expectations on which the economy rests 
(Beckert, 2016: 64). Reviving the utopian capacity to represent alternative 
imaginary futures may be a necessary first step towards then considering 
the plans and political artefacts necessary to pursue them. In her work on 
utopia as methodology, Ruth Levitas argues that the utopian impulse never 
dies altogether, but it requires excavation via sociological interpretation. 
Indeed, Levitas suggests that utopia is present and felt in everyday life, 
even when it is not explicitly represented: 
“Utopia does not require the imaginative construction of whole other 
worlds. It occurs as an embedded element in a wide range of human 
practice and culture - in the individual and collective creative practices 
of art as well as in its reproduction and consumption. Utopian method 
here is primarily hermeneutic... If we start from here, it is evident that 
contemporary culture is saturated with utopianism, even (or especially) 
where there is no figurative representation of an alternative world.” 
(Levitas, 2016: 5).  
Levitas suggests that sociology has a foundational relationship to the 
development and excavation of utopias, but that this relationship was 
repressed by the institutionalization of sociology as a discipline. She points 
out that the birth of sociology coincided with the birth of utopian science 
fiction writing, and the two were combined in the work of HG Wells and 
others, for whom sociology would be “knowledge rendered imaginatively 
and with an element of personality, that is to say, in the highest sense of 
the term, literature” (quoted in Levitas, 2016: 87). 
The utopian impulse is essentially a normative and a critical one, seeing as 
it stems from a feeling that something important is lacking in the present. 
To study the utopian ideas and representations that are embedded in 
society is to engage in a form of moral sociology, unearthing the things 
that most matter to people, but which the present does not deliver or fulfill 
(Sayer, 2011). As Levitas writes: 
“If utopia is the expression of what is missing, of the experience of lack in 
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must include the consideration of unfulfilled aspirations which it 
produces. The sociology of utopia defines the legitimate relation between 
the two.” 
(Levitas, 2016: 67) 
Levitas is clear that utopias are not restricted to literary fictions or 
blueprints. Utopia simply resides in the orientation towards the future that 
is simultaneously a critique of the present. In this sense, it rivals monetary 
and other financial ways of connecting past, present and future. The 
impossibility of snuffing out the utopian impulse is an indication of moral 
capacities that cannot be conscripted to the neoliberal attempt to replace 
every moral commitment with a credit obligation and to constrain hope 
within monetary investment. To the extent that financial calculations of 
the future are no longer sufficient, we need to now consider what extra-
economic techniques of fiction might be plausible when representing the 
future. By retaining a sense that they are fictitious and imaginary, utopian 
representations of the future have a realism that financial calculations lack.    
If utopia begins with a sense of ‘lack’, sometimes progressing into literary 
and/or sociological form, it is important to also consider how it exists in 
the form of a plan. Levitas is reluctant to elevate the utopian plan to the 
ultimate form of utopia, but nevertheless views the ‘architecture’ of utopia 
as something that sociology might describe and uncover. She writes: 
“Utopia as architecture is both less and more than a model or blueprint. 
Less, in being a provisional hypothesis about how society might be, 
offered as part of a dialogue, neither intending nor constituting a 
forecast, recognising itself as in part a present future. More, in inviting 
both writer and reader to imagine themselves, as well as the world, 
otherwise.” 
(Levitas, 2016: 198) 
Blueprints are necessary if these future visions are ever to be contemporary 
realities, and then empirical histories. ‘Real utopias’, enclaves of 
alternative political-economic organization, provide exceptional examples 
of experimentation that sociologists are well placed to discover, study and 
publicise (Wright, 2010). These might include non-capitalist ownership 
and governance structures (as in co-operative enterprises), alternative 
currencies and legal instruments which safeguard common ownership of 
assets. In that respect, utopias needn’t only exist as future imaginaries, but 
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existing in the present. However, these spaces may be the basis of hope for 
the future, precisely because they demonstrate the possibility that literary 
fictions can occasionally pass into blueprints, and blueprints into 
contemporary realities. In that sense, it isn’t only the fictional 
expectations of orthodox financial instruments – credit, business model, 
discounted cash flow – that can render the imaginary real, but other paths 
between imagination and practice are possible. It also suggests that moral 
commitments to the future and to future generations can be acted upon in 
ways that are not only channeled via risk and credit.  
 
Imagining sustainable prosperity 
It is commonly assumed that, in assuming infinite capitalist growth, the 
neoliberal (or Keynesian) model of political economy is not ‘sustainable’. 
But in another way, the problem with it is that it is too sustainable: it 
seems impermeable to critique and survives all manner of social, 
environmental and financial crises. The epistemological premise, that the 
future is beyond political control and is therefore best managed through 
private risk calculation, becomes self-reinforcing, even if it gradually 
undermines its own premise through the problems of calculative 
performativity and snowballing inequality identified above. The result is 
that neither the state nor private investment appears adequate to deal with 
problems whose scale grows all the time. The problem today is that, even 
while the future remains uncertain and imaginary, disastrous ‘fictional 
expectations’ now possess far greater credibility than happy and 
prosperous ‘fictional expectations’. The category of the ‘Anthropocene’ 
does not in itself specify how the future will play out, but it does narrate 
the long-term future in terms of the irreversible consequences of human 
activity of recent centuries. Optimistic versions of the Anthropocene 
imaginary are rare and receive less credit. The retreat further into 
neoliberal techniques of risk management (such as accumulating cash, for 
defensive reasons) can become more appealing on an individual level, 
where positive narratives about the collective future are absent.   
The nature of emergent ecological crises defies the mentality of both 
‘planning’ and ‘risk’. The complexity and ‘wickedness’ of contemporary 
ecological problems means that there is never sufficient expert knowledge 
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‘future’ was imagined, designed and implemented as a collective project. 
As Jamieson argues, “there are many uncertainties concerning 
anthropogenic climate change, yet we cannot wait until all the facts are in 
before we respond. All the facts may never be in” (Jamieson, 2010: 78). 
Moreover, the era in which progressive, collective futurity was most 
reflexively experienced and practiced – roughly from 1870-1970 – 
coincided with accelerating industrialization of a sort that is now deemed 
to imperil the future, especially due to the rise of the oil economy, and all 
of the attendant new social practices (jet travel, suburbanization etc) that 
resulted (Mitchell, 2013; Bonneuil & Fressoz, 2016). The post-war 
Keynesian boom, which appears like a halcyon age in terms of social 
security and falling inequality, was also the era in which macroeconomic 
growth became measured and institutionalized as the basic promise that 
states made regarding the future (Piketty, 2014; Philipsen, 2015). In that 
sense, it was not a promise that could be delivered on indefinitely. 
However, the very long time horizons and non-linear forms of causality 
involved mean that financial-utilitarian private risk calculus of the future 
is also limited. The capacity to cost ‘externalities’ into capitalist 
investment strategies, via techniques such as carbon trading and CSR, may 
work for easily calculable costs but not for the very long-term effects which 
will impact on unborn generations. Moreover, excessive confidence in the 
capacity of corporations and financial markets to accommodate negative 
‘externalities’, as calculable risks, potentially re-confirms a sense of 
political helplessness. The worry is that, as corporations speak increasingly 
about problems such as climate change, they do so in ways that pushes 
business solutions as the only realistic ones. Wright and Nyberg argue, 
drawing on Boltanski, that corporations have successfully internalized 
anti-capitalist environmental critique, so as to refashion it as a source of 
legitimacy: 
“The tragedy is that in incorporating environmental critique, businesses 
have created a 'fantasy' of sustainability that suggests markets, 
innovation, and technology will solve climate change, thereby obscuring 
the phenomenon of creative self-destruction, and 'managing' the crisis.” 
(Wright & Nyberg, 2016: 44) 
A pattern emerges, in which private economic interests represent 
collective reform as impossible, wait for the consequences, then present 
themselves as best-placed to handle the fall-out (Mirowski, 2014). Equally, 
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monetary prices on different outcomes is a way of avoiding alternative 
orientations to the future from emerging.  
The challenge is to discover a new temporality, that recaptures a modernist 
enthusiasm and care for the future, but does not express this only via 
existing (or previous) tools of economic modernity. Optimism is necessary 
in order that new ‘fictional expectations’ can become viable, but needs 
coupling to profound pessimism regarding the status quo. Utopias and ‘the 
future’ need rekindling in a way that has echoes of classical modernity, but 
in some ways these will need to be an exit from certain aspects of 
modernity (for instance from infinite capitalist growth). The future’s 
uncertainty needs revitalizing, but without simply offering this as an 
opportunity for risk modelling and financial profit.  Conservative utopias, 
which safeguard stable relationships and common goods over time, 
represent a potentially radical advance on neoliberalism. Different types of 
moral commitment to the future are required, accompanied by different 
institutional mechanisms for mediating these commitments. This analysis 
throws up a number of questions for students of moral economy, which 
require a combination of empirical, philosophical and ‘fictional’ answers.   
1. How is ‘the future’ (including the very distant future) currently 
instituted as a fictional expectation, by private investors, risk 
managers, individuals and governments? What are the moral 
limitations of these commitments? The work of Beckert and others, on 
money, credit, capitalization of future income streams, indicates how 
moral economy can explore the institutions, instruments and fictions 
through which the future can be represented ‘as if’ it were already 
empirical and manageable. The dream of neoliberalism is of a society 
in which private economic instruments and strategies are the only 
mechanism through which the future is viewed, organizing collective 
ignorance of the future into the constitutional principle of a free 
society. However, actors are never as isolated from each other as this 
vision suggests. Broader narratives and valuations of the future 
(especially the long-term future) play a role in orientating people. One 
question is how the necessarily incalculable, transcendent, infinite 
dimensions of the future impact upon efforts to reduce the future to 
questions of risk and reputation. Where do necessarily finite 
calculations run up against almost infinite values? 
2. What philosophical and moral resources are available for placing value 
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started out by suggesting that moral economy has a bias towards 
presentist, contractual visions of justice – assuming that questions of 
valuation are predicated on moral philosophies that only take those 
present into account. It needs to be considered that, just as moral 
sympathies are felt towards those who are outside of contractual 
arrangements or proximate society (Boltanski, 1999; 2010), they can 
also be felt towards those who are distant in time (Forrester, 2016). 
Rudiments of this might be discovered in the existential fact of 
individual finitude, which expresses itself in actions which seek to 
extend beyond one’s own death, or even beyond the death of everyone 
currently alive. Arguably, meaning and moral commitment are 
unthinkable without some sense of transcendent, non-mortal matters 
of concern (Scheffler, 2013). These philosophical and psychological 
commitments need to be understood, such that their implications for 
economic value can be imagined and articulated. Discovering them is 
not only a matter of reading moral philosophy, but a sociological 
project of listening to the embedded utopias and sense of meaning 
that exist for individuals in their day-to-day lives (Back, 2007; Levitas, 
2016; Sayer, 2011). 
3. What are the distinctive utopias of the Anthropocene? The task today 
is to refresh optimism – and credible optimism – regarding the future, 
but in ways that cannot simply mean a nostalgic revival for the 
modernism of the 20th century. This means picking apart past utopias 
as examples of what ‘the future’ can mean, rather than dreaming of 
neo-Keynesianism, neo-brutalism, neo-socialism, as the exit from 
neo-liberalism. ‘The future’ of the past has lessons for how collective 
political action was imagined and instituted, for showing how utopian 
thought might even be possible at all. For Jameson, this is the first 
imperative, to simply believe that alternatives are possible to 
articulate, thereby breaking out of the post-modern insistence that 
they are not: “perhaps, then, the task of utopianism today is less to 
propose more elaborated versions of an alternative social system than 
simply to argue the need for one” (Jameson, 2016: 43). Simply 
rediscovering the capacity to hope for a different future – and not 
simply to expect future return on investment or future debt obligation 
– is the first task of anthropocenic utopianism.  
4. How else might economic promises be instituted? This paper has 
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acted upon, including credit, capitalization and inheritance. In each 
case, we need to consider how ‘real utopias’ are possible, enclaves of 
alternative practice which preserve aspects of the present as legacies 
to be left for future generations. If economic categories of rent, credit, 
property, equity, inheritance are latently moral in character, as 
Durkheimians and moral economists insist, then the question is how 
these might be reformulated for moral frameworks which make 
commitments to agents who are very distant in the future. ‘Real 
utopias’ which conserve goods, such as common assets and 
relationships, such that they are beyond exploitation or privatization 
offer the hope of a future in which the future itself is viewed 
differently.  
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